INTRODUCTION
The Crater Peak vent of Mount Spurr volcano, located 125 km west of Anchorage (figs. 1, 2) and last active in 1953 (Juehle and Coulter, 1955; Wilcox, 1959) , erupted three times in 1992 following 10 months of heightened seismicity. The first eruption occurred on June 27, 1992, and was followed by similar events on August 18 and September [16] [17] 1992 . This paper provides an overview of these eruptions and the Alaska Volcano Observatory's response to them.
cally similar to the ash-flow tuffs (Nye and Turner, 1990) . A basaltic-andesite satellitic cone developed at the same time in the caldera breach. The present Crater Peak represents a second period of satellite cone-building at the same location; it reaches an elevation of 2,309 m, 3.5 km south of Mount Spurr's summit. Crater Peak consists of lavas and pyroclastic flows of mafic andesite (53-57 weight percent Si02, Nye and Turner, 1990) . The 40 tephra units correlated to this vent range in age from 5,000 yr to present (Riehle, 1985) . Eruption products that are apparent mixtures of Crater Peak and summit dome complex magmas indicate that the two systems were partly coeval (Nye and Turner, 1990) .
Prior to 1992, the only witnessed eruption of Mount Spurr occurred on July 9, 1953. This eruption also issued from the Crater Peak vent and consisted of two main explosive pulses, followed by steam and minor ash emission. The eruption cloud rose to over 20,000 m above sea level and deposited 3 to 6 mm of andesitic (55 weight percent Si02) ash on Anchorage (Juehle and Coulter, 1955; Wilcox, 1959) . A debris flow dammed the Chakachatna River downslope from Crater Peak, and the dam created an 8-km-long lake. The dam was overtopped and breached within a week.
ROLE OF THE ALASKA VOLCANO OBSERVATORY
The Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO) was established in 1988, following the 1986 eruption of Augustine Volcano; the observatory conducted its first full eruption response with the Redoubt Volcano episode of 1989-90 (Miller and Chouet, 1994) . AVO is a cooperative program of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), University of Alaska Fairbanks Geophysical Institute (UAFGI), and Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys (ADGGS). AVO is supported by both the Department of Interior through the USGS Volcano Hazards and Geothermal Studies Program and by the State of Alaska. AVO's primary mission is to communicate timely warnings of unrest and potential eruption of Alaska's volcanoes and to investigate the fundamental processes of hazardous volcanism, with a view toward improved eruption warnings and hazard assessments.
Since World War 11, Anchorage has become the population and economic center of Alaska; over half the population of the State is currently concentrated in the Anchorage area. Three of the Cook Inlet volcanoes-Augustine Volcano, Redoubt Volcano, and Mount Spurr-are frequently active. Within the past decade, their eruptions have produced ash clouds that were hazardous to aircraft as well as to the general populace. Accordingly, the Cook Inlet region presents the greatest array of volcano hazards in Alaska and is the focus of AVO's efforts.
AVO distributes updates ( fig. 3 ) each Friday to summarize the weekly status of the monitored Cook Inlet volcanoes and any reported activity of unmonitored volcanoes on the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands. During periods of volcanic unrest and eruption crises, additional updates are issued when significant changes in activity should be made known to the public (Brantley, 1990) . Updates were issued frequently to a prioritized list of well over 100 recipients during the Crater Peak eruptions. AVO at Fairbanks faxes to the local Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the local National Weather Service (NWS), Alaska Department of Emergency Services (ADES), local military bases, Governor's and State offices, television and radio stations, and airlines. AVO at Anchorage faxes to the local FAA, the local NWS, local military bases, USGS offices, other federal agencies, television and radio stations, news wire services, and airlines. Updates are also distributed by electronic mail to the volcano information networks.
A level of concern color code was established during the Redoubt Volcano eruptions to quickly and simply convey AVO's evaluation of eruption potential and eruption severity (Brantley, 1990; Miller and Chouet, 1994) . This code was modified slightly for use with the Crater Peak eruptions ( fig. 4) . When a volcanic crisis begins, telephone calls are made to Federal, State, and local agencies with critical public safety responsibilities to give the level of concern color code as the update is being prepared. A calldown procedure, likewise established for the Redoubt Volcano eruptions (Brantley, 1990; Miller and Chouet, 1994) , was used for the Crater Peak eruptions. Responsibility for calls are shared between AVO at Anchorage and AVO at Fairbanks, so all concerned agencies are contacted within minutes.
ERUPTIONS-MONITORING AND RESPONSE CHRONOLOGY PRE-ERUPTION PERIOD
Early indication of unrest at Mount Spurr was a conspicuous swarm of volcano-tectonic (VT) earthquakes during the last half of August 1991 (table 1; Power and others, this volume). Unlike swarms that had occurred in 1982 and 1989, this one was directly under Crater Peak within a volume that had been aseismic for at least a decade (Jolly and others, 1994) , and it was followed by caldera-wide seismicity. By February of 1992, seismic activity had increased to such a level that discussions of Mount Spurr's unrest were included in AVO's weekly updates. Through April 
LEVEL OF CONCERN COLOR CODE
To more concisely describe our level of concern about possible eruptive activity at Mt. Spurr, the Alaska Volcano Observatory has developed a color-coded classification system. The definitions of the various colors have been modified slightly since the 1989-90 eruption of Redoubt Volcano. General descriptions of the type of activity associated with each of the four color codes are included below. The various colors indicating our level of concern about potential eruptive behavior are as follows:
volcano is in its normal "dormant" state.
Volcano is restless.
Seismic activity is elevated. Potential for eruptive activity is increased. A plume of gas and steam may rise several thousand feet above the volcano which may contain minor amounts of ash.
Small ash eruption expected or confirmed. Plume(s) not likely to rise above 25,000 feet above sea level.
Seismic disturbance recorded on local seismic stations, but not recorded at more distant locations.
Large ash eruptions expected or confirmed. Plume likely to rise above 25,000 feet above sea level.
Strong seismic signal recorded on all local and commonly on more distant stations. as used for the 1992 eruptions of Crater Peak, Mount Spurr, Alaska. This code was distributed to government agencies, the media, airlines, and the public with the announcement of level Yellow for Mount Spurr on June 26, the day prior to the first eruption. -.
Began weekly reporting of increased seismicity at Mount Spurr; noted seismicity had been above background since mid-August I99 1.
Seismicity

Update
Highest number of earthquakes per day (28) recorded to date.
-.
First small tremor bursts detected beneath Crater Peak.
-- T H E 1 9 9 2 E R U P T I O N S OF CRATER P E A K VENT, M O U N T S P U R R , A L A S K A Increased long-period seismicity at depths of 20 to 40 km beneath Mount Spurr suggested that magma was again being replenished within the volcano. Update warned of possible eruption within days or weeks; color code continued at Yellow.
Weekly update reported continued high level of seismicity; no additional seismicity in 20-to 40-km depth range, but eruption within days to weeks possible.
Weak tremor began and was accompanied by an increase in deep earthquakes.
Tremor amplitude increased.
Announcement of color code Red.
Tremor signified an 11-minute preliminary eruptive burst.
Ash column rose to 4,600 m.
Announcement of color code Red: eruption began at 10:36 p.m. ADT and NWS wind data showed that the ash cloud would move easterly with fallout expected over the MatanuskaSusitna Valley region and perhaps as far south as Anchorage.
Glow observed over Crater Peak.
Seismicity indicated start of main eruption.
Telemetry lost from seismic station CPK on Crater Peak rim.
Plume rose to 10,700 m, reported by PIREPS and NWS radar. Warning issued that southern edge of plume could produce --ashfall on Anchorage.
Plume rose to 12,200 m, as determined from NWS radar.
Beginning of intense incandescence, as recorded on the slowscan television camera at Kasilof and on the video camera at AVO in Anchorage.
Maximum plume height of 13,900 m measured from NWS radar.
Tremor ended.
Eruption ended and seismicity declined although tremor continued; NWS radar showed no plume at Crater Peak; ashfall affected the Matanuska-Susitna Valley and stayed north of Anchorage.
Color code downgraded to Orange due to decreased seismicity, low-level tremor continued.
Summary of eruption issued; color code remained at Orange because of low-level tremor.
Steam plumes rose 3,000 to 6,000 m above Crater Peak; seismicity continued but declined.
Elevated seismicity indicated the possibility of a small eruption with little warning. Therefore, color code remained at Orange. Elevated seismicity indicated the possibility of a small eruption with little warning. Therefore, color code remained at Orange.
Elevated seismicity indicated the possibility of a small eruption with little warning. Therefore, color code remained at Orange.
Announcement of downgrade to color code Yellow. Tremor amplitude decreased and time between tremor episodes increased.
Continued low-level seismicity.
Continued low-level seismicity
Continuous volcanic tremor began.
Weak, continuous volcanic tremor resumed under Crater Peak; increased SO2 emission; heightened possibility of eruption during the next several days.
Announcement of color code Red based on intense seismicity.
Announcement of color code Red: intense seismic tremor at Crater Peak; tremor amplitude comparable to levels preceding the June 27 and September I7 eruptions; large eruption seemed likely within 24 to 48 hrs.
Tremor abruptly ended.
Irregular tremor signified unrest of the volcano. Eruption could occur with little or no warning; color code remained at Red.
Continued volcanic unrest indicated by banded tremor with tremor bursts that lasted I to 2 hours.
Announcement of downgrade to color code Yellow. More quiet time between tremor periods; banded tremor, which often precedes eruption, continued; volcano still considered restless.
Continued banded tremor and an 18-hour period of sustained tremor.
Intermittent tremor persisted
Daily weekday reports of continued irregular levels of seismicity and occasional gas emission, as well as other observations of the volcano. Caution issued that an eruption could occur with little warning.
Rate of shallow volcano-tectonic earthquakes increased.
Announcement of upgrade to color code Orange based on shallow seismic swarm; eruption could occur without additional warning.
Increased shallow seismicity.
9:00 p.m. 06:00* Update Orange Number of seismic events was 1.5Imin for 3.5 hrs; this was the most energetic seismic swarm of 1992 eruptive period.
T H E 1992 ERUPTIONS OF CRATER PEAK VENT, M O U N T SPURR, ALASKA Color code downgraded to Orange. Seismicity decreased significantly since the buildup of 11/9/92.
Decreased seismicity from the swarm of November 9; continued unrest could result in eruption without additional warnlng.
Color code downgraded to Yellow based on 2 days of relative seismic quiescence; however, volcanic unrest continued.
Daily weekday reports of continued irregular levels of seismicity and occasional gas emission, as well as other observations of the volcano, still indicated that an eruption could occur with little warning.
Color code would remain at Yellow until early January because: (1) continued high level of seismicity, and (2) eruptions and seismic crises since June eruption occurred at 55-, 30-, and 53-day intervals; and by early January, 60 days had passed since the seismic swarms on November 9-10.
Swarm of small earthquakes occurred at depth of 8 to 12 km beneath Crater Peak during past 5 days; continued unrest indicated that the volcano was still unstable and eruption could occur with little warning.
Swarm of small earthquakes of December 20 continued through December 26, followed by increased shallow 2-hour periods of tremor-like events beneath Crater Peak on December 27; seismicity then decreased; volcano still considered unstable.
Continued low-level seismicity including two earthquakes beneath Crater Peak and two low-amplitude tremor episodes during the previous 24 hrs. Decision made for color code to stay at Yellow.
Return to weekly Friday reporting of low-level seismicity, steam plumes, and other observations.
Color code downgraded to Green. Seismicity continued at a low level for a time period longer than that between the 27 June and 18 August 1992 eruptions (see 1212 1/92); possibility of steam and ash explosions still existed.
Mention of Mount Spurr seismicity and other observations in weekly updates.
Announcement that level of seismicitv at Mount S~u r r had returned to background levels andthat specificAmention of Mount Spurr in weekly updates would be discontinued. of 1992, however, updates stated that the increased seismicity was not considered precursory to eruption. The heightened seismicity continued, punctuated with stronger pulses, including a prominent pulse beneath Crater Peak in May. In an internal memorandum dated June 3, 1992, AVO scientists interpreted the seismicity as the result of increasing magmatic pressure at depth, which caused intrusion into conduits below Crater Peak and the summit dome complex and minor movement of caldera faults. The memo urged increased monitoring, as well as advising government agencies and the aviation industry to review plans for coping with an eruption. Both of these recommendations were implemented.
The number of daily locatable VT earthquakes reached 28 on June 5 and then declined to about 3 to 6 events per day. Volcanic tremor began on June 6 , and an overflight on June 8 revealed upwelling in the crater lake, which had turned in color from green to gray. AVO released a special update describing the situation and stating that there would be an increase in overflights and in sensitivity of the 24-hour alarm system at the AVO Seismology Laboratory in Fairbanks, along with an added evening shift for AVO personnel. As many as 24 shallow tremor bursts per day, each burst lasting I to 10 minutes, were recorded at stations within 10 km of Crater Peak from June 6 to 26 (McNutt and others, this volume). A field party spent 6 hours in the crater on June 11, measured a lake temperature of 50°C and pH of 2.5, and collected water samples for chemical analysis (Keith and others, this volume). The party observed small geysersnever before seen in the crater-at the base of the north crater wall. Geysering did not coincide with seismic tremor events.
On June 17, AVO informed ADES of the evolving situation at Mount Spurr. On June 19, AVO sent briefing materials to the Governor, noting the "well above normal" activity and continuing episodes of tremor. The Anchorage Daily News published a front-page article on June 21 that described how Mount Spurr was being monitored and what the public might expect from an eruption.
JUNE 27 ERUPTION
Seismic behavior changed ominously on June 24 when a tremor episode lasted 154 minutes, followed 12 hours later by a similar episode that lasted 142 minutes. Eight additional tremor bursts occurred within the next 8 hours. The weekly update of 10:30 a.m. Alaska daylight time (ADT) on June 26 reported "well above normal" seismic activity but still cautioned that an eruption might not be imminent in view of an absence of long-period (LP) earthquakes. At about the same time, aerial observations of the crater revealed that the lake had almost completely drained and that several large rocks had impacted the resulting mud flat. At 12:04 p.m. ADT, tremor that was continuous and stronger than earlier bursts began. AVO formally issued a warning of level of concern color code Yellow at 4:30 p.m. ADT and went on 24-hour duty. At 3:00 a.m. ADT on June 27, a swarm of VT earthquakes struck at 0-to 2-km depths beneath Crater Peak; their rate soon increased to about one every 2 minutes. Three LP events accompanied this swarm. Tremor amplitude abruptly doubled at 7:04 a.m. ADT. This increase in amplitude was later interpreted to represent the onset of eruption, although weather clouds prevented visual verification. At 7:16 a.m. ADT, AVO began an emergency calldown announcing level of concern color code Orange. About the same time, telemetry was lost from the seismic station 400 m from the vent and an Alaska Airlines pilot reported that an eruption plume had risen 5,000 m above the cloud cover. AVO announced color code Red at 9:10 a.m. ADT. Tremor amplitude gradually increased, peaking between 9:35 a.m. and 10:25 a.m. ADT and registering on stations more than 100 km away. Pilots estimated the plume at mid-morning as high as 9,000 m and the NWS measured a maximum plume height of 14,500 m with C-band radar (Alaska Volcano Observatory, 1993 ; Rose and others, this volume). The tephra cloud moved northward and ash began falling on Denali National Park at 10:30 a.m. ADT. Debris flows swept southward down narrow drainages and entered the Chakachatna River in three places. Most debris followed the course of the 1953 lahar. At about 11 :30 a.m. ADT, seismicity decreased abruptly and the eruption was over. Weather and steam obscured Crater Peak and the eruption plume track from aerial observation on the afternoon of June 27, but paths of the debris flows were visible on the lower flanks of the volcano (Meyer and Trabant, this volume).
At 9:00 a.m. ADT on June 28, the level of concern was downgraded to Yellow. Aerial observation revealed a black northward-broadening swath of tephra on snow fields and glaciers. Ash thickness was about 1 to 2 mm at Denali National Park and Manley Hot Springs, 260 and 420 km north of Crater Peak, respectively (Neal and others, this volume). This region is sparsely populated and there were no other reports of tephra there. The ash cloud continued northward to the Beaufort Sea, then it turned southeast into Canada and the coterminous United States, where it became indistinguishable from weather clouds about July 2.
The level of concern color code was downgraded to Green on July 8. This was done partly on the basis of greatly reduced seismicity and SO2 emission, but also on the basis of analogy to the single-eruption pattern of 1953. The downgrading to color code Green proved to be premature.
AUGUST 18 ERUPTION
Following the June eruption, seismicity remained low through the first half of August. Only one shallow and two deep earthquakes were recorded between August 12 and 17. Because the closest operational seismic station at that time was 5 km from the vent, several attempts were made to reestablish a seismic station on the crater rim. These were unsuccessful because of poor weather conditions. At 3:37 p.m. ADT on August 18, a 16-minute episode of weak tremor and several LP events began, but these rather obscure events were not identified until post-eruption analysis of the data. At 3:48 p.m. ADT, a pilot reported an ash-rich plume. With confirmation of this plume at 4:25 p.m., AVO began a calldown announcing level of concern color code Yellow. The main eruption be-gan at 4:42 p.m. ADT, when strong tremor was recorded by all Mount Spurr seismic stations. AVO began a calldown announcing color code Orange at 4:47 p.m. ADT, but repeated the calldown process 11 minutes later to raise the color code to Red. By 4:58 p.m. ADT, a subplinian column had risen through low clouds to a height of 11,000 m, and it ultimately reached nearly 14,000 m. From an aircraft only 2.5 km away, AVO staff observed and videotaped a dark roiling cloud that was periodically surrounded by lenticular shock waves. Large bombs were thrown 800 m above the vent. Small-volume pyroclastic flows of breadcrusted blocks descended the east and southeast flanks of Crater Peak; these flows formed coarse, clast-supported lobate deposits with steep-fronted margins. Other flows mixed with snow and ice high on the cone and became lahars. A late fusillade of mostly lithic ballistic projectiles, some as large as 1 m, were hurled as far as 10 km southeastward (Waitt and others, this volume). More than 170 lightning strikes were detected by the AVO lightning detection system (LDS) during the second half of the eruption (Paskievitch and others, this volume). The eruption ended at 8:10 p.m. ADT.
Upper-level winds moved the eruption plume eastsoutheast directly over Anchorage, where it deposited as much as 3 mm of sand-sized ash (Neal and others, this volume). A satellite image 44 minutes after the onset of eruption shows the plume extending 80 km east from the volcano over an area of 2,000 km 2 . Three hours after onset of eruption, the leading edge of the plume was 300 km southeast of Mount Spurr, and its area had grown to 21,000 km 2 .
Ashfall forced the closing of Anchorage International Airport for 20 hours (N.W. Gibson, Anchorage International Airport, written commun., 1993). Air quality alerts were issued in Anchorage during the fallout period and also on the following day, as vehicle traffic stirred up ash again (R.B. Stewart, Office of Emergency Management, Municipality of Anchorage, written commun., 1993). Reworked windblown ash continued to reduce air quality until the first snow of autumn, and then it reappeared during the summer of 1993.
SEPTEMBER 16-17 ERUPTION
Following the August eruption, deep seismicity gradually increased, and by mid-September it had returned to levels comparable to mid-June. AVO teams visiting the crater on September 7 and 16 noted nothing unusual. At about 7:30 p.m. ADT on September 16, however, discrete seismic events and weak tremor were detected by the newly reinstalled crater rim station. Tremor amplitude increased at 10:25 p.m. ADT, and at 10:33 p.m. ADT, AVO declared concern color code Red and began the emergency calldown. An eruption began at 10:36 p.m. ADT that lasted 11 minutes. Incandescence was recorded on the video camera at AVO-Anchorage and on the telemetered slow-scan television camera at Kasilof, 120 km southeast of Crater Peak just south of Kenai on the Kenai Peninsula. Weak tremor through the next hour foreshadowed the main phase of eruption, which began at 12:03 a.m. ADT on September 17. Intermittent bright incandescence could be seen from Anchorage.
The September 17 eruption lasted 3.6 hours. Pyroclastic flows swept down the south-southeast and southeast flanks of Crater Peak and mixed with snow and ice to become lahars. These flows were similar in appearance to pyroclastic flows, but they were cool and water saturated hours after emplacement. Tephra fallout on the Kidazgeni Glacier generated a debris flow that temporarily dammed the Chakachatna River. Once again, a narrow ballistic field extended at least 10 km from the vent along the south margin of the tephra plume. The eruption closed with a strong swarm of about 50 VT shocks between 5 and 10 km in depth, which may reflect readjustment of the conduit after magma withdrawal.
The plume moved eastward, dusted the north edge of Anchorage and deposited about 1.5 mm of ash in Palmer, Wasilla, and nearby communities in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley north of Anchorage. Very light ashfall was reported in the town of Glenallen, 350 km east of Crater Peak.
SEISMIC SWARMS: OCTOBER 2-6, NOVEMBER 9-10, AND DECEMBER 21-27
The level of seismicity remained elevated, and several seismic crises caused concern at AVO. Tremor between 7:00 p.m. ADT on October 1 and 6:30 p.m. ADT on October 2, followed by quasiperiodic tremor over the next 72 hours, prompted AVO to announce concern color code Red twice during that period, but no eruption ensued.
At 10:07 p.m. Alaska standard time (AST) on November 9, AVO again announced concern color code Red an hour into an intense seismic swarm that lasted 3.5 hours and contained 170 detected earthquakes. These earthquakes had mixed frequency contents, occurred within a very restricted volume 1.2 km beneath the vent, and had magnitudes as large as 1.7. Again, seismicity receded without eruption. Because the duration of this swarm was similar to each of the three eruptions and its seismic energy release was the largest of the 1992 eruptive period, the swarm may be viewed as a "failed" eruption, in which magma was rapidly emplaced at shallow depth (Power and others, this volume).
A final flurry of earthquakes beneath Crater Peak on December 21 through 26 was followed by a few hours of shallow tremor-like activity on December 27. This time, AVO's advisories remained at concern color code Yellow.
At the beginning of 1993, Mount Spurr returned to a low level of seismic activity: 1 to 10 small earthquakes per day at depths of 0 to 40 km and rare periods of possible weak tremor. This background seismic "noise" fluctuated daily and seasonally (G. Tytgat and others, unpub. data). Some shallow seismic events were correlated with observed landslides, rockfalls, glacial melt runouts, and even airplanes flying over the volcano. Some seismicity may be attributed to posteruptive readjustments of the magmatic and hydrothermal systems, and some remains unexplained. On March 5, 1993, after a time period greater than the seismic quiescence between the June 27 and August 18, 1992, eruptions had passed uneventfully, AVO lowered the level of concern color code to Green.
Vigorous white steam plumes caused false reports of eruption several times during 1993. However, volcanic gas (SO2 and C02) emissions remained at or below the limit of detectability (less than 1,000 tonnes per day C02, less than about 4 tonneslday SO2, Doukas and Gerlach, this volume). New concern arose on June 29, 1993, when tremor-like seismicity appeared on records from several of the Crater Peak seismic stations. A field party was fortuitously present near Crater Peak and observed the source to be an outburst flood from Kidazgeni Glacier on the southeast slope of Mount Spurr (Nye and others, this volume) .
During and following the 1992 eruptions, field investigations were carried out to map and sample the eruption products. Work in the vent area of the crater was precluded through the summer of 1993 for safety reasons. This was a lesson drawn from the sudden explosions at Galeras Volcano, Columbia, and Guagua Pichincha Volcano, Ecuador, in early 1993, that resulted in the deaths of eight volcanologists, and the September 1992 eruption of Crater Peak, which followed a period of seismic quiescence and occurred just hours after an AVO team had left the vent.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ERUPTIONS
The June, August, and September 1992 eruptions produced 44, 52, and 56 million m3 of tephra (12, 14, and 15 million m3 dense rock equivalent or DRE), respectively. In each case, juvenile tephra clasts ranged from proximal breadcrusted bombs to distal ash in a narrowly defined band of fallout extending downwind (Gardner and others, 1993; Neal and others, this volume) . The vent migrated about 50 m westward from June to August to September, and so in September it was nestled against the west-northwest crater wall. Near-field ejecta from each eruption were, therefore, directed progressively more strongly to the east-southeast. Otherwise, vent geometry changed remarkably little. Distribution of pyroclastic flow deposits, ballistic showers, and lahars shows that all flanks of a volcanic cone are hazardous during subplinian activity (Miller and others, this volume; Waitt, this volume) .
The eruptions were strongly magmatic in character. The dominant juvenile component of 1992 ejecta is dense to scoriaceous dark gray andesite (57 weight percent Si02 bulk composition) with a more silicic (60-62 weight percent Si02) microlite-rich matrix of brown glass (Harbin and others, this volume; Nye and others, this volume; Swanson and others, this volume). A subordinate volume of bulk-chemically identical andesite is more crystal-rich and contains clear matrix glass of rhyolitic composition (73-75 weight percent Si02). Trace amounts of rhyolite pumice with sparse plagioclase and quartz phenocrysts were also erupted. Pyroclastic flows of August and September contained large partially melted and greatly inflated felsic metamorphic xenoliths (Miller and others, this volume) . The estimated total volume of magma for the three Crater Peak eruptions of 41 million m3 DRE is markedly smaller than the estimated 200 million m 3 DRE (Gardner and others, 1994) released in some 20 significant eruptive events during the 1989-90 Redoubt activity.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSE
AVO's response plan went into effect as soon as unrest was recognized at Mount Spurr in August of 1991, and it continued through post-eruptive readjustment to inactive status. For alerting a community to an imminent volcanic danger, Mount Spurr provided a favorable situation. Its Holocene deposits had been mapped and some 40 tephra layers from its 5,000-year-old Crater Peak vent had been identified (Riehle, 1985; Nye and Turner, 1990) ; these deposits place it among the more prolific volcanoes in the eastern Aleutian Arc. Moreover, it had erupted during historical time (Juehle and Coulter, 1955; Wilcox, 1959) . In retrospect, the singularity of the 1953 eruption proved misleading for what was to come, but it did provide a useful example of Mount Spurr's behavior. Because of the relatively well documented record of activity, T H E 1992 ERUPTIONS O F CRATER PEAK VENT, MOUNT SPURR, ALASKA Mount Spurr had already been instrumented and monitored for over a decade when it reawakened. This lengthy period of monitored quiescence allowed the August 1991 seismicity to be accurately interpreted as anomalous. Mount Spurr's reawakening was gradual, and thus it permitted plans to be made and warnings to be given in a timely fashion. It was not so fast that AVO was caught off guard, nor so slow that the warnings of a future eruption could be dismissed. Care must be taken when turning observations of increasing seismicity into an appropriate warning, because not all cases of increasing seismicity, even if caused by rising magma, lead to eruption. Often, magma can solidify in the conduit without venting (Newhall and Dzurisin, 1988) , as may have occurred during the seismic swarms of May, October, November, and December of 1992 (table 1) . In retrospect, informing a community about the possibility of an eruption a month in advance, and issuing a serious warning a day in advance, is a useful time frame. Eruption warnings of October and November that were not fulfilled were considered by the public to be proper caution rather than mistaken judgment, coming as they did late in the episode.
Although seismic monitoring was the primary tool in AVO'S response, geologic insight was necessary both for informed warnings of what was to come and for the original decision to monitor the seismic activity of Mount Spurr. A broad host of observations and techniques was used to evaluate the volcano's condition.
INTERPRETATION OF SEISMICITY
Following the establishment of AVO, seismic stations were-added to the existing Mount Spurr network, making a total of 10 stations within 15 km of the summit (McNutt and others, this volume; Power and others, this volume). Seismicity that began in August 1991 eventually defined an active conduit without, unlike Redoubt Volcano, a hint of a volumetrically large storage zone. That elevated seismicity occurred throughout the volcanic massif indicates that stresses induced by magma intrusion and perhaps even magmatic vapor affected the entire Mount Spurr system. Helicorders, continuous digital data, event-triggered data, real-time seismic amplitude measurements (RSAM; Endo and Murray, 1991) and seismic spectral amplitude measurements (SSAM) were all used for analysis of the seismic information (McNutt and others, this volume).
Three types of shallow seismicity indicative of magma movement were identified: (1) tremor bursts that lasted 1 to 10 minutes, (2) continuous tremor lasting 2 hours to several days, and (3) eruption tremor (McNutt and others, this volume). Fourteen hours of continuous tremor and 4 hours of shallow VT earthquakes preceded the June eruption. However, this seismic pattern that made forecast of the June eruption possible was not repeated in subsequent events. Only 3 hours of increased seismicity preceded the September eruption; accordingly, the warning from AVO was issued just minutes ahead of the onset of eruptive activity and an hour and a half before the main pulse. Unfortunately, no detectable seismic activity foreshadowed the August eruption. Had it been possible to replace the near-vent seismic station destroyed during the June eruption, shallow precursory tremor bursts might have been recorded. However, the absence of the near-vent station does not explain the lack of locatable VT earthquakes before that eruption. Presumably, the strongest precursory signals were generated at the outset of the eruptive episode because rising magma and gases were reopening a cold, plugged conduit.
EVIDENCE FROM HYDROTHERMAL ACTIVITY AND GAS EMISSION
The sense of urgency engendered by May and June seismicity was heightened by observations of the small crater lake that had existed since the 1953 eruption. Days prior to the first eruption, lake water changed from blue-green to gray, became turbid with areas of upwelling, and finally evaporated or drained (Keith and others, this volume). A single pair of measurements, one during dormancy and the other in June, revealed a two-orders-of-magnitude increase in S04/CI in the lake.
The increase in S04/CI may relate to the failure of airborne SO2 emission measurements to detect the rise of magma (Doukas and Gerlach, this volume). Airborne measurements were begun when anomalous seismicity was first detected. Not until the June eruption did the flux of SO2 from the vent increase significantly, and SO2 concentrations returned to low values 2 days later. SO2 flux was also low prior to and following the August and September eruptions. Yet, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration's (NASA) Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) indicated 200k60, 230k70, and 400-+120 kt of SO2 emitted during the June, August, and September eruptions, respectively. It is likely that SO2 released during pre-eruptive intrusion was being scrubbed and the resulting H2S and sulfate dissolved in the hydrothermal system. Doukas and Gerlach (this volume) and Bluth and others (this volume) conclude from independent techniques that a significant amount of H2S was emitted during the 1992 eruptions. Airborne C 0 2 measurements made following the September eruption did detect substantial magmatic outgassing, which suggests that monitoring of this less water-soluble gas might have provided a more diagnostic tool than monitoring of SO2 (Doukas and Gerlach, this volume).
VISUAL OBSERVATION OF ERUPTIONS
Visual observations, when they can be obtained, are the most direct means of assessing eruptive activity. AVO'S remote, slow-scan, continuously recording television camera at Kasilof on the Kenai Peninsula was turned to view Crater Peak, 120 km away, on May 6, 1992; it provided real-time views for AVO staff in both Anchorage and Fairbanks. In addition, a video camera was set up on the roof of AVO in Anchorage and wired into the operations room. Both cameras recorded the incandescence at the crater rim during the September 16-17 eruption (Neal and others, this volume). When weather permitted, the information from these cameras was critical in responding to false eruption alarms.
Especially helpful to AVO were the pilot reports (PIREPS) of visual observations passed on by FAA and NWS. For example, although seismicity indicated that the June eruption was imminent, the ash cloud was reported by a PIREP before seismic verification could be made and while clouds prevented groundbased visual observations of the volcano. A PIREP revealed the August eruption, because there was no precursory seismicity. PIREPs also provided a valuable record of eruption column height as a function of time.
DETECTION OF VOLCANIC LIGHTNING
Once volcanic activity has been detected seismically or visually, the most important task is to establish whether ash is being emitted. This can be difficult, given weather and light conditions in Alaska. AVO has established a lightning detection system (LDS) for the Cook Inlet region; this system is based on observations that lightning is commonly associated with vigorous, ash-laden eruptive columns at volcanoes throughout the world (Hoblitt, 1994; Paskievitch and others, this volume) . Detected lightning might therefore indicate significant ash emission. During the Crater Peak eruptions, this technique proved only partially successful. A ring of lightning 10 km in diameter, centered 5 km east of the vent, was detected during the August eruption, but LDS did not detect lightning during the June and September eruptions. That lightning accompanied the June and September eruptions is indicated by interruptions in signals from seismic stations (Davis and McNutt, 1993) .
RADAR OBSERVATION OF ERUPTIVE COLUMNS
One technique for detection of eruptive columns is C-band radar. An experiment conducted in cooperation with NWS by Rose and others (this volume) at Kenai provided a first test with excellent results. Radar imaged the Crater Peak eruption columns regardless of weather, and it also allowed estimates of column height and mass flux to be made. A limitation of radar observation is that only coarser particles are reflective, and so neither the top of the eruptive column, nor the cloud tens of minutes after cessation of eruption, can be seen.
PROJECTION OF PLUME PATHS
During the 1980 eruptions of Mount St. Helens, graphic .plots of wind direction and velocity at several altitudes, used with permission of NWS, proved useful in determining the path of eruption plumes (Miller and others, 1981) . Their usefulness was demonstrated again at Mount Spurr, particularly in calculating the time for the eruption cloud of August 18 to reach Anchorage. In addition, it was immediately obvious that the June 27 eruption cloud would drift north toward sparsely populated areas and would not affect Anchorage. Winds for the September 18 eruption were flowing northeastward from the vent. A warning of possible ashfall was given to Anchorage, although the model correctly showed the ash-laden winds passing just north of the city. The model correctly predicted that ash would fall mainly on the Matanuska-Susitna Valley. Also important in tracking ash were calls from citizens informing AVO of ashfall locations and thicknesses.
TRACKING OF PLUMES BY SATELLITE
The hazards of volcanic ash emitted during eruptions extend well beyond local communities. For the first several days, a cloud from an explosive eruption is dangerous to high-flying jets (Casadevall, 1992; Casadevall and Krohn, this volume) . During the Mount Spurr eruptions, advanced very high resolution radiometry (AVHRR) data were processed using a new high-resolution picture transmission (HRPT) information processing system (HIPS) at NWS for real-time tracking of volcanic clouds (Schneider and others, this volume). The August and September eruption clouds were followed for more than 80 hours and thousands of kilometers (Schneider and others, this volume). Further development of this technique may make it possible to determine particle-size distribution and particle density in volcanic clouds, so the severity of hazard they pose can be more quantitatively evaluated.
TOMS satellite images were likewise used to track the eruption clouds for as many as 7 days after formation (Bluth and others, this volume). Sulfur diox-ide content of clouds from the August and September eruptions increased during their first 2 days, probably by atmospheric oxidation of H2S. At least half the 400f120 kt of SO2 emitted by the three eruptions reached the lower stratosphere.
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
AVO's use of updates, level of concern color code, calldown lists, and direct personal communications worked effectively to notify civil authorities and the general public of expected eruptions and resulting hazards from Mount Spurr. Intensive media coverage, based on interviews with AVO personnel by both local and national radio and television and the local newspaper, added to AVO's outreach.
AVO's color code is central to rapid communication of the level of hazard to concerned constituencies, particularly the aviation industry. As indicated in figure 4, increasing levels of concern convey both increasing likelihood of eruption and increasing potential or actual size of eruption. No simple one-dimensional scale can adequately describe an impending or ongoing event. Yet, simplicity of communication is essential during an emergency. In practice, use of the code is tempered by awareness of the consequences that communication of the concern will cause. During the 1992 Crater Peak eruptions, color was used primarily to indicate likelihood of eruption. Red meant that an eruption was imminent or ongoing; Red was used because all events were major ones with eruptive columns that reached flight levels and produced regional tephra falls.
Two occasions show the kinds of decisions that must be made in applying the code and that include factors beyond the simple criteria in the code. The volcano's behavior arguably fell within the condition "restless" beginning in August of 1991. However, uncertainty as to the significance of the early seismicity, and knowledge that premature use of warning colors would entail unnecessary fueling and routing costs for the airlines, led to deferral of use of color code Yellow. A more literally based interpretation of the code was used on August 18, 1992, when AVO downgraded the concern level from Red to Orange at the end of the eruption, but 3 hours before ash stopped falling on Anchorage. The color code was not meant to address conditions away from the volcano, so the downgrading probably did not seem an adequate portrayal of the situation to citizens of Anchorage who were just beginning to be affected by the eruption. Nevertheless, the AVO decision was appropriate to signal to the airlines and others that voluminous ash production at the vent had ceased and the end of ashfall in Anchorage could be predicted.
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE 1992 ERUPTIONS
Economic losses from the Crater Peak eruptions were mainly effects of ashfall at Anchorage International Airport and associated disruption of air traffic from the August 18 eruption. Significant losses also included cleanup costs for the Municipality of Anchorage, adjacent military bases, and towns in the Matanuska-Susitna Valley. The cost of cleanup from the August 18, 1992, ashfall for Anchorage International Airport, Merrill Field, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, including cleaning buildings, runways, and aircraft on the ground, was at least $683,000 (Anchorage International Airport, unpub. report, 1993) . Revenue lost from the closure of Anchorage International Airport for 20 hours is estimated at $276,000 (Casadevall and Krohn, this volume). The Municipality of Anchorage reported nearly $2 million in damage, office closures, and cleanup costs from the August eruption (Municipality of Anchorage, unpub. report, 1993) . In addition, there were numerous, small-scale losses incurred by businesses and citizens from the initial ashfall and reworked volcanic ash that affected equipment such as vehicle engines, building air-circulation systems, and computers in banks, businesses, and local military installations. Economic impacts of ashfall on the upper Kenai Peninsula, Cordova, and the Matanuska-Susitna Valley have not been evaluated. AVO received calls from these areas following all three eruptions reporting school closures, poor road conditions, and health concerns. No loss of life resulted directly from the eruptions. Two heart attacks, one fatal, from shoveling ashfall were reported in Anchorage.
In contrast to the estimate of $160 million in losses from the 1989-90 Redoubt eruptions (Tuck and Huskey, 1992) , total losses from Crater Peak eruptions are informally estimated to be from $5 to 8 million. This large difference arises from at least two causes. First, there were more eruptive pulses and greater eruptive volume in the Redoubt episode. Second, Redoubt losses were dominated by damage sustained by five jets (Casadevall, 1994) . Damage to one of these aircraft nearly resulted in a catastrophe. The Crater Peak eruptions carried the same potential for disaster. However, increased awareness of the ash-cloud hazard within the aviation community and emplacement of an effective warning system by AVO, in concert with other agencies, resulted in minimal economic loss to air carriers.
VOLCANOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1992 ERUPTIONS
mains to be learned about underlying processes. T h e origin o f seismicity accompanying m a g m a flow is not clearly understood, nor a r e the mechanisms by which new m a g m a reopens a n existing conduit. Whereas petrologic inferences can b e drawn about equilibrium conditions of m a g m a storage, the chemical a n d physical changes that accompany m a g m a rise and produce the large variations in eruptive behavior are poorly known.
A hope f o r t h e future i s that geophysical and geologic insights from active systems such a s those gained f r o m t h e Crater P e a k eruptions will provide the basis for a better understanding o f magma's ascent t o the surface. S u c h understanding could lead to better predictive capability-that is, t o predict whether m a g m a will merely intrude or will erupt, and to predict whether eruptions a r e likely t o b e explosive o r effusive.
